We describe several software side-channel attacks based on inter-process leakage through the sate of the CPU's memory cache. [...] experimentally demonstrate their applicability to real systems, such as OpenSSL and Linux's(Previously [heh, tags eventually came, but not as we had hoped].)
dm-cryptencrypted partitions (in the latter case, the full key can be recovered after just 800 writes to the partition, taking 65 milliseconds).
cryptography is depressing
As described elsewhere, I've quit LiveJournal. If you're interested in my continuing posts, you should look at one of these (each contains feed…
They published a paper on Dremel, my favorite previously-unpublished tool from the Google toolchest. Greg Linden discusses it: "[...] it is capable…
I finally wrote up my recent adventures in treemapping, complete with nifty clickable visualizations.